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Monopolistic screening under learning by doing
Abstract
This article investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework where
agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' learning rates are private knowledge.
In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that whether
learning effects are over- or underexploited crucially depends on whether more efficient agents also
learn faster (so costs diverge through learning effects) or whether it is the less efficient agents who learn
faster (so costs converge). We further show that an overexploitation of learning effects can occur also if
the full-commitment assumption is relaxed.
  
 
 
Socioeconomic Institute 
Sozialökonomisches Institut 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 0718 
 
Monopolistic Screening under Learning By Doing 
 
Dennis Gärtner 
 
December 2007  
 
 
Socioeconomic Institute 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper No. 0718 
 
Monopolistic Screening under Learning By Doing 
 
 
 
 
December 2007 
 
Author’s address: Dennis Gärtner 
 E-mail: dennis.gaertner@soi.uzh.ch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Publisher Sozialökonomisches Institut 
Bibliothek (Working Paper) 
Rämistrasse 71 
CH-8006 Zürich 
Phone: +41-44-634 21 37 
Fax: +41-44-634 49 82 
URL: www.soi.uzh.ch 
E-mail: soilib@soi.uzh.ch 
Monopolistic Screening under
Learning By Doing∗
Dennis Ga¨rtner†
University of Zu¨rich
December 2007
Abstract
This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic ad-
verse selection framework when agents’ production technologies
display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private
knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment
available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects
are over- or under-exploited crucially depends on whether learn-
ing effects increase or decrease the principal’s uncertainty about
agents’ costs of production. Hence, what drives the over- or under-
exploitation of learning effects is whether more efficient agents also
learn faster (so costs diverge through learning effects) or whether
it is the less efficient agents who learn faster (so costs converge).
Furthermore, we show that if divergence in costs through learning
effects is strong enough, learning effects will not be exploited at
all, in a sense to be made precise.
JEL Classification: D82, L14, L43, L51, O31
Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Learning by Doing, Regula-
tion
∗This work heavily draws on Chapter 1 of my dissertation (Ga¨rtner, 2007). It
has benefited from comments by Bernard Salanie´ and seminar participants at the
University of Zu¨rich. Moreover, I am indebted to Armin Schmutzler and Jean Ti-
role for invaluable discussions based on earlier versions. Financial support for this
project from the Swiss National Science Foundation under Grant No. PBZH1-108484
is gratefully acknowledged.
†University of Zu¨rich, Socioeconomic Institute, Blu¨mlisalpstr. 10, CH-8006 Zurich,
Switzerland. email: dennis.gaertner@soi.uzh.ch.
1
1 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
That private knowledge on technology is a key issue in regulatory prac-
tice has been a central theme in the literature for years (see Baron and
Myerson, 1982 and the influential work by Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
While we already have a fairly good understanding of optimal regulation
in stationary settings, relatively little is still known about dynamic as-
pects of regulation and the interplay between regulation and innovation
incentives when technology is endogenous. This is particularly unfortu-
nate because innovation plays a prominent role in many traditional fields
of government regulation such as telecommunications or electric utilities.
In such industries, adequate regulatory practice must invariable take ac-
count of its dynamic impact on innovation.
This paper contributes to closing this gap by considering a well-
documented kind of innovation: innovation through ‘learning by doing.’1
Under learning by doing, the regulator’s task is to induce a level of pro-
duction which takes careful account of future costs-savings through learn-
ing effects. In the tradition of the recent literature on regulation, this
paper explores the challenge posed to the regulator when firms enjoy
superior information also on this aspect of their technology.
We investigate this issue in a general principal-agent model where, in
each period, a principal (the regulatory authority) procures a good from
an agent (the regulated firm) in exchange for a monetary transfer. To
capture learning effects, production costs are assumed to depend on the
previous period’s level of production, where the extent of this learning
effect is known only to the agent.
Our principal finding is that whether private information causes learn-
ing-effects to be under- or overexploited relative to the full-information
benchmark crucially depends on how agents’ learning potential and their
absolute level of efficiency are related: If learning permits inherently
more efficient agents to expand their lead over less efficient agents, then
learning effects will be underexploited. If, however, learning allows in-
herently less efficient agents to catch up, then learning effects will be
overexploited.
The basic intuition for this result is simple: By the familiar rent-
efficiency tradeoff, distortions in output are driven by the principal’s
incentive to limit the rent payable to more efficient agents, which in turn
corresponds to their cost advantage over less efficient agents. If learning
1See Lewis and Yildirim (2002b) for an extensive list of industries where learning
effects have been documented.
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magnifies efficiency differences, the usual downward distortion results.
However, if learning leads less efficient agents to catch up, the cost ad-
vantage enjoyed by more efficient agents decreases with first-period out-
put, in which case upward distortions result. Moreover, we show that
downward distortions in the former case may in fact be so strong as to
induce a level of production which is inefficiently low even from a static
point of view (i.e., ignoring dynamic learning effects).
To the best of our knowledge, this insight—particularly the possibility
of learning effects being overexploited—is new to the regulation and pro-
curement literature. In the most immediately related paper, Lewis and
Yildirim (2002a) (see also Lewis and Yildirim, 2002b) also investigate the
regulation of a privately informed monopolist who learns by doing. Two
of their key findings are the following: First, learning effects will always
be underexploited relative to a dynamically efficient benchmark. Second,
however, learning effects will never be left unexploited altogether in the
sense that output will nonetheless always exceed its statically efficient
level.
The difference with our findings can be explained by thinking of
learning-effects in terms of a cost and a benefit side—costs being higher
output today, and benefits being lower production costs tomorrow. Lewis
and Yildirim’s model focusses on private information only on the cost
side: The regulator does not know the costs of raising output today, but
he knows the impact this will have on tomorrow’s costs.2 In contrast,
our model introduces asymmetric information on the benefit side by sup-
posing that the firm is privately informed on its learning rate, that is,
on the extent to which higher output today translates into lower costs
tomorrow. Our analysis shows that the aforementioned two key results
of the previous literature are both sensitive to this aspect of private in-
formation.
On a more basic level, this paper’s contribution may also be under-
stood as sharpening basic economic intuition concerning the connection
between asymmetric information and the volume of trade: It has become
a virtual commonplace to associate private information with inefficiently
low trade. Our results bring back to mind that this intuition depends
crucially on the presumption that increased trade exacerbates the value
of private information and thereby informational rents. While this struc-
ture arises naturally in many models, we argue that learning by doing
provides a case in point where it is just as natural for the reverse to be
2The same comment applies to learning effects as modeled in Gaudet et al. (1996).
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true.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up
a basic two-period model of learning by doing and describes the full-
information benchmark. Section 3 presents the optimal contract under
asymmetric information and full commitment. We discuss both its ef-
ficiency properties, whether it even makes use of learning effects in the
first place, and briefly discuss a number of extensions and generaliza-
tions. Section 4 in turn investigates contracts under spot commitment.
Owing to the analytical complexity introduced by limited commitment,
we essentially restrict ourselves to showing that the main insights of Sec-
tion 3—particularly the possibility of inefficiently high trade—generalize
to the case of spot commitment. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a brief
discussion of the results and further possible applications of the general
principal-agent structure considered in this paper.
2 A Simple Model of Learning By Doing
This section presents the basic model and, as a benchmark for our later
analysis, characterizes the efficient allocation.
2.1 Setting up the Model
We consider a simple model in which a principal procures a good from
an agent over two periods t ∈ {1, 2}. Let qt ∈ Qt denote the amount
of the good procured in period t and let zt ∈ IR denote the monetary
transfer from the principal to the agent in that period. Unless stated
differently, we let Qt ≡ IR0. In each period t, let the principal’s utility
be given by vt = S(qt) − zt, where S ′ > 0 and S ′′ < 0. The principal
discounts with δ ∈ (0, 1), overall utility from transactions over the two
periods being V = v1 + δv2. The agent produces the good at a constant
marginal cost ct > 0 within each period, yielding a utility of ut = zt−ctqt
in each period t. The agent discounts with the same factor δ, leading to
an overall utility of U = u1 + δu2. Both principal and agent are assumed
risk neutral.3
The remaining assumptions detail the agent’s production technology
and its dependence on private information (we briefly discuss their relax-
ation in the context of contracts under full commitment in Section 3.5).
3Letting principal and agent share the same risk attitude and time preference
focusses our analysis by avoiding motives to trade risk or intertemporal utility.
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To focus our analysis, we assume the agent’s first-period marginal costs
c1 to be observable.
4 However, we let the agent possess private informa-
tion concerning the structure of second-period costs. Private information
is represented by the scalar θ (the agent’s “type”), which is drawn from
a commonly known distribution over Θ, and which the agent privately
observes prior to first-period production (and prior to contracting). For
simplicity, most of our analysis will assume two types Θ = {θ, θ} with
θ > θ and Prob(θ = θ) = ν.
Second-period marginal costs c2 are a function of θ and first-period
output q1. We model the presence of learning effects in production by
letting ∂c2/∂q1 < 0: The higher first-period production, the lower the
marginal costs of production in period 2 (for any given type θ).5
Next, we assume that c2 is strictly decreasing in θ for all q1. Thus,
an agent with a higher θ is more efficient in that he produces any output
schedule q = (q1, q2) at a lower cost. Note that this assumption represents
more than a mere normalization of the type space Θ: Since it is assumed
to hold for all q1, it will provide a key sorting condition in our derivation
of the optimal contract under asymmetric information.
We call |∂c2/∂q1| the agent’s learning rate, and say that an agent
learns faster if he has a higher learning rate. Note that an agent may
learn faster even though he is less efficient (i.e., has a lower θ). Indeed,
key aspects of our analysis will crucially depend on whether learning rates
increase or decrease in θ. To facilitate this, we assume that learning rates
either increase or decrease in θ for all q1. Figure 1 illustrates the relevant
constellations.
The following example not only provides an illustration of the setup,
but—due to its analytical tractability—will prove useful for numerical
examples given further below:
Example 1. Let second-period costs be given by c2(q1, θ) = c(θ)−γ(θ)q1
with c strictly increasing in θ, and with γ > 0, and let the principal’s
objective function be given by S(qt) = aqt − bq2t , where a, b > 0. Then
4As we discuss in Section 3.5 in more detail, introducing private information on
first-period costs c1 introduces a second, competing motive for the principal to distort
quantities in order to reduce first-period informational rents. This second motive in
isolation already being well understood in the standard framework without learning,
letting c1 be observable serves to make this papers’ contribution more transparent.
5Note that we assume marginal costs to be constant within each period but change
discontinuously from one period to the next. This assumption serves to isolate learn-
ing effects from simple scale economies. Indeed, what distinguishes the two is that
learning by doing depends on both previous production volumes and on time.
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c2(q1, θ)
c2(q1, θ)
q1
c2
c2(q1, θ)
c2(q1, θ)
q1
c2
(a) More Efficient Agent
Learns Faster.
(b) Less Efficient Agent
Learns Faster.
Figure 1: Types of Learning Effects.
more efficient agents learn faster if γ is increasing in θ, whereas less
efficient agents learn faster if γ is decreasing in θ.6
In what follows, we will consider various settings for negotiating the
exchanged quantities and transfers. Common to these settings, however,
is the usual assumption of full bargaining power resting with the princi-
pal: The principal offers a contract (or a choice of contracts)to the agent,
which the agent can decide to accept or reject. If the agent rejects, he
obtains a (type-independent) reservation payoff of zero and negotiations
end.
2.2 The Efficient Full-Information Benchmark
As a point of comparison for our later analysis, we first consider the
efficient full-information benchmark. Assume for a moment that the
agent’s type θ is known to the principal. For any output schedule q =
(q1, q2), the joint surplus of trade is then given by
W (q; θ) ≡ S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]. (1)
Given his bargaining power and any known type θ, the informed princi-
pal will offer a contract (q∗(θ), z∗(θ)) which is efficient (i.e., first best),
specifying production levels q∗(θ) = (q∗1(θ), q
∗
2(θ)) which maximize joint
surplus W (q; θ), and payments z∗(θ) = (z∗1(θ), z
∗
2(θ)) which leave the
6To make this example entirely compatible with our assumptions, the range of
permissible q1 and q2, (i.e., Q1 and Q2) must be bounded from above so as to ensure
S′(qt) > 0 and c2(q1, θ) > c2(q1, θ) > 0.
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agent his reservation utility.7
For later comparisons, we define conditional first-best output levels
as follows. For any (q2; θ), let qˆ
∗
1(q2; θ) ≡ argmaxq2 W (q1, q2; θ) and,
similarly, for any (q1, θ) let qˆ
∗
2(q1; θ) ≡ argmaxq1 W (q1, q2; θ).
Lemma 2.1. The first-best output schedule q∗(θ) and the contingent
first-best output levels qˆ∗1(q2; θ) and qˆ
∗
2(q1; θ) have the following properties:
(a) qˆ∗2 is increasing in both q1 and θ;
(b) qˆ∗1 is increasing in q2, and increasing (decreasing) in θ if more (less)
efficient agents learn faster;
(c) q∗ is increasing in θ if more efficient agents learn faster.
The proof of this and all later results is presented in the Appendix.
As a general matter, we establish comparative static results such as
Lemma 2.1 using supermodular analysis (cf. Milgrom and Roberts, 1990;
Topkis, 1998). This approach exploits basic complementarity relations
among arguments of the objective function and avoids imposing any un-
necessary concavitity assumptions on objectives.8 The latter is particu-
larly valuable in our setting due to the concavity which learning effects
naturally introduce into the cost function.9
These technical issues aside, the intuition for the above results is con-
ceivably simple: Higher first-period output lowers the cost of additional
second-period output, thereby raising incentives to expand the latter.
Conversely, higher second-period output raises incentives to lower that
output’s costs through learning effects by expanding first-period output.
Thus, each period’s conditionally efficient output rises in the other pe-
riod’s output level. Moreover, a higher θ makes additional second-period
7Note that the first-best transfer schedule z∗ will never be unique. Indeed, if
(q∗, z∗) is a first-best contract, then any contract (q∗, z˜) with the same discounted
value of transfers (i.e., with z˜1 + δz˜2 = z∗1 + δz
∗
2) will also be first-best.
8Nonetheless, readers unfamiliar with this technique will quickly verify the results
under additional concavity assumptions by means of the first-order approach.
9Supermodular analysis extends also to situations where optimizers are not unique.
In this case, comparative static results are interpretable in terms of ordering relations
among sets. Although all our results permit such an interpretation, to avoid tedious
notation, we will be somewhat loose in distinguishing between the set of optimizers
and its individual elements.
Moreover, while comparative statics derived by this technique are very general in
terms of covering also the possibility of corner solutions, this comes at the cost of all
results applying only in a weak sense (i.e., “increasing” in Lemma 2.1 is to be read
as “nondecreasing”). Since essentially all complementarity relations underlying our
results are in fact strict , strict versions of our comparative static predictions are easily
established for interior maximizers under mild additional conditions (see Edlin and
Shannon, 1998, for technical details).
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output less costly, which is why qˆ∗2 is increasing in θ. Incentives to raise
first-period output in turn rise in the agent’s learning rate, which is why
qˆ∗1’s response to a change in θ depends on how the learning rate changes
in θ. Finally, if more efficient agents also learn faster, these effects com-
plement each other, making q∗ rise in θ. Note that no such robust com-
parative result is available if the less efficient agent learns faster: a rise
in θ then provides direct incentives to raise q2 and lower q1, which are
counteracted however by the complementarity between q1 and q2, leaving
the overall result ambiguous.
3 Contracts under Full Commitment
In contractual problems with investment characteristics, the outcome is
generally sensitive to the level of intertemporal commitment available to
the principal (see for instance Fudenberg et al., 1990). In this section,
we investigate our problem of learning by doing under the most extreme
form of commitment: We assume that at the start of period one (but
after the agent has learned his type), the principal can offer a contract
settling all future exchange which cannot be reneged on.
3.1 Characterizing the Optimal Contract
The full-commitment setting has the convenient property that, by the
revelation principle and the stationarity of private information, we may
equivalently restrict our attention to truth-revealing mechanisms of the
type {q(θ˜), z(θ˜)}θ˜∈Θ which specify contracts (i.e., exchanged quantities
and transfers) for each type, and where these contracts are designed so
as to make it optimal for the agent to truthfully reveal his type. For any
such contract, we let
U(θ) ≡ z1(θ)− c1q1(θ) + δ
{
z2(θ)− c2[q1(θ), θ]q2(θ)
}
(2)
denote the θ-type’s equilibrium rent .
To relax notation in this section, for any function of θ ∈ {θ, θ}, we
let an upper (lower) bar indicate that the function is evaluated at θ (θ)
and drop the argument θ. Thus, for instance, U ≡ U(θ) and U ≡ U(θ).
Finally, we let
Φ(q) ≡ δq2[c2(q1)− c2(q1)] (3)
denote the cost advantage enjoyed by the θ-agent over the θ-agent for any
output schedule q = (q1, q2). Intuitively, this cost advantage measures
the value of private information enjoyed by the more efficient θ-type.
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With this notation in place, the optimal contract under full commit-
ment can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 3.1. The menu of contracts offered by the uninformed prin-
cipal under full commitment is such that production schedules qSB and
qSB solve
qSB ∈ argmax
q
W (q) and qSB ∈ argmax
q
{
W (q)− ν
1−νΦ(q)
}
. (4)
Transfers zSB and zSB = are chosen such that types’ equilibrium rents
are U = Φ(qSB) and U = 0.
This result is easily understood by recognizing that, despite the pres-
ence of learning effects, sorting (i.e., the relevance of incentive con-
straints) is entirely driven by the assumption that c2 is decreasing in θ.
Since this unambiguously makes the θ-agent more efficient, the relevant
incentive problem is keeping him from falsely reporting θ by granting him
a rent equal to his cost advantage Φ(q) for the corresponding production
schedule—and leaving the θ-agent a rent of zero. Deducting these rents
from joint surplus, the principal is left with reduced form profits (i.e.,
incorporating the optimal choice of transfers z and z) of
Π(q,q) ≡ ν[W (q)− Φ(q)]+ (1− ν)W (q), (5)
maximization of which corresponds to condition (4).
The objective function (5) embodies the usual rent-efficiency trade-
off faced by an uninformed principal: His menu of contracts trades off
expected joint surplus νW (q) + (1 − ν)W (q) against the expected rent
payments νΦ(q) required to induce truthful reporting by the θ-type. This
tradeoff leads to inefficiencies whose precise nature we analyze next.
3.2 Partial Distortionary Incentives
A trivial implication of Proposition 3.1 is the usual ‘no distortion at the
top’-result: In spite of information being private, the efficient θ-type still
produces first-best quantities in both periods, so qSB = q∗. This leaves us
with an investigation of the nature of distortions ‘at the bottom’, that is,
of inefficiencies inherent in the contract offered to the inefficient θ-type.
The rent-efficiency tradeoff responsible for this distortion involves the
simultaneous use of two instruments, q1
SB and q2
SB. To clarify their indi-
vidual roles and make the principal’s motives more transparent, we first
analyze what we shall call ‘partial’ distortionary incentives. In analogy
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to the conditional first-best production schedules qˆ1
∗(q2) and qˆ2
∗(q1), we
let qˆ1
SB(q2) and qˆ2
SB(q1) denote the levels of q1 and q2, respectively, which
maximize W (q)− ν
1−νΦ(q) conditional on the other period’s output level.
With these definitions in place, the following partial distortionary mo-
tives can be identified:
Proposition 3.2. Under full commitment, the uninformed principal faces
the following (partial) distortionary incentives in designing the θ-type’s
production schedule:
(a) Conditional on any first-period output q1, the uninformed principal
will distort second-period output downward, so qˆ2
SB(q1)  qˆ2∗(q1)
for all q1 ∈ Q1.
(b) Conditional on any second-period output q2, the uninformed prin-
cipal will distort first-period output
(i) downward if the more efficient agent learns faster, so qˆ1
SB(q2) 
qˆ1
∗(q2) for all q2 ∈ Q2, and
(ii) upward if the less efficient agent learns faster, so qˆ1
SB(q2) 
qˆ1
∗(q2) for all q2 ∈ Q2.
Part (a) concerning second-period distortionary incentives is not sur-
prising: Given a first-period output level, second-period marginal costs
c2 are a datum, and hence the principal’s optimization problem is iden-
tical to the standard one-period model of procurement with privately
known and constant marginal costs, for which downward distortion (i.e.,
inefficiently low trade) is a well-known result.
More interestingly, Part (b) identifies the distortionary incentives in-
volved in choosing first-period output—and thereby the extent to which
learning effects are under- or overexploited for any given second-period
output. That the direction of these distortions crucially depends on
which agent learns faster is quickly understood by referring back to our
illustration of the two cases in Figure 1: If the more efficient agent
learns faster, decreasing q1 leads types’ second-period costs c2 to con-
verge, thereby reducing the θ-type’s cost advantage (for fixed q2) and
hence the rent payable to him. Conversely, if the less efficient agent
learns faster, the same effect is achieved by an increase in q1.
3.3 Overall Distortions in Trade
The partial distortions analyzed above provide a direct measure of the
over- or underexploitation of learning effects by asking whether the unin-
formed principal’s contracts can be pareto-improved upon by expanding
3 CONTRACTS UNDER FULL COMMITMENT 11
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∗
(a) More Efficient Agent
Learns Faster.
(b) Less Efficient Agent
Learns Faster.
Figure 2: The Direction of Overall Distortions.
or reducing first-period output. Since the principal ultimately distorts
both periods’ output schedules simultaneously, however, attaining the
full welfare optimum will also require simultaneous adjustments in both
quantities.
As the next result shows, if the more efficient type learns faster, at-
taining the full welfare optimum requires expanding both periods’ output:
Partial distortions in this case are representative of overall distortions,
so overall trade is inefficiently low.
Proposition 3.3. Under full commitment, if the more efficient type
learns faster, then private information causes an overall downward dis-
tortion in both first- and second-period output for the inefficient type, so
qSB  q∗.
Figure 2(a) illustrates the results under the additional assumption
that both W and W − νΦ are strictly concave. By the implied unique-
ness of the maximizers and by Lemma 2.1, the conditional first-best
outputs qˆ1
∗(q2) and qˆ2
∗(q1) are increasing functions. Moreover, concav-
ity of W implies that the qˆ1
∗-curve crosses the qˆ2
∗-curve from below at
q∗ = (q1∗, q2∗) in (q1, q2)-space. Now by Proposition 3.2(a), the qˆ2
SB-
curve will lie south of the qˆ2
∗-curve, and by Proposition 3.2(bi), the
qˆ1
SB-curve will lie west of the qˆ1
∗-curve. Hence, the equilibrium under
private information—determined by the intersection of the qˆ2
SB- and the
qˆ1
SB-curve—must lie in the shaded area in Figure 2(a). As illustrated,
this area must lie in the southwest quadrant of q∗.
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Why an analogous argument fails when the less efficient agent learns
faster is illustrated in Figure 2(b). Again, the qˆ2
SB-curve must lie south
of the qˆ2
∗-curve. However, Proposition 3.2(bii) in this case tells us that
there will be an upward distortion in first-period output given any second-
period output, so that the new equilibrium must lie east of the qˆ1
∗-curve.
Hence, only equilibria with q1
SB < q1
∗ and q2SB > q2∗ can be excluded.10
Particularly, if the less efficient agent learns faster, it is possible for
overall distortions to be upward in both periods, so that q1
SB > q1
∗ and
q2
SB > q2
∗. This is illustrated by the following extension to Example 1:
Example 2. Assume the value of output to the principal is given by
S(qt) = 100qt − 80q2t , cost structures are c1 = 75, c2(q1) = 30− 60q1, and
c2(q1) = 50 − 95q1, types are equally likely, and the common discount
factor is δ = 0.7. First-best production then entails q∗ = (0.30, 0.55) and
q∗ = (0.38, 0.54), whereas contracts under asymmetric information and
full commitment will entail qSB = (0.49, 0.58) for the θ-type.
Alternative parameterizations of Example 1 will produce the other
two possible directions in overall distortions.
3.4 Are Learning Effects Exploited At All?
Having gauged the outcome under incomplete information against ef-
ficient benchmarks, this section investigates whether downward distor-
tionary incentives can be so severe as to eliminate the exploitation of
learning effects altogether. For comparison, we consider the outcome
which results if either first-period output has no impact on second-period
marginal costs, so ∂
∂q1
c2 ≡ 0, or both principal and agent behave myopi-
cally, so δ = 0. The resulting choice of q1 in either case will maximize
first-period surplus S(q1) − c1q1 alone. Motivated by this, we introduce
the following terminology:
Definition 3.4. Let q◦1 ≡ argmaxq{S(q) − c1q}. A first-period output
level q1 exploits learning effects if q1  q◦1; it neglects learning effects if
q1  q◦.
10A simple generalization of this last argument (generalized beyond the graphical
analysis’ additional assumptions) runs as follows. Let q∗ denote the first-best output
schedule (if the first-best output schedule is not unique, let q∗ denote any first-best
schedule such that there exists no other first-best output schedule involving lower
first- and higher second-period output). Then for any q = (q1, q2) with q1 < q1∗
and q2 > q2∗, we have W (q) < W (q∗). Moreover, Φ(q)  Φ(q∗) for any such q
because Φ is decreasing in q1 and increasing in q2. But then (1− ν)W (q)− νΦ(q) <
(1 − ν)W (q∗)− νΦ(q∗), so that no such q can maximize the uninformed principal’s
objective in (4).
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Equivalently (recall that S ′′ < 0), learning effects are exploited if the
marginal benefit of first-period output S ′ (weakly) falls short of marginal
costs c1, and neglected if the reverse holds.
Obviously, first-best quantities always exploit learning effects. This
need not be true for q1
SB, the first-period quantity procured from the
θ-type. The following result gives sufficient conditions for either case:
Proposition 3.5. The contract offered to the θ-agent exploits learning
effects if ∣∣ ∂
∂q1
c2(q1)
∣∣  ν · ∣∣ ∂
∂q1
c2(q1)
∣∣ (6)
for all q1 ∈ Q1; it neglects learning effects if (6) is reversed for all q1 ∈
Q1.
Thus, learning effects are exploited if either the efficient agent does
not learn too much faster than the inefficient agent, or if efficient types are
scarce enough. Intuitively, both ensure that the principal’s rent-efficiency
tradeoff is sufficiently in favor of efficiency—the former by reducing the
efficient type’s cost advantage and thereby his rent, the latter by making
it less likely that such a rent will have to be paid in the first place.
In relation to our previous results in Section 3.3, Proposition 3.5
shows that even though downward distortions in q1 may ensue if the
inefficient agent learns faster, they will never be so strong as to eliminate
the exploitation of learning effects altogether. In relation to the previous
literature, Proposition 3.5 points out that this may however be the case
if the efficient agent learns faster, depending on the distribution of types
and how strongly learning rates differ. Particularly, the possibility of
learning effects being neglected is absent in Lewis and Yildirim’s (2002a)
model.
3.5 Extensions and Limitations
Our analysis thus far has relied on several simplifying assumptions. Be-
fore the next section proceeds to relax what might seem the most serious
and restrictive one—the assumption of full commitment—, we briefly
discuss other possible extensions and the challenge they pose to our find-
ings.
‘Varying Learning Advantages’: Assuming that one of the agents un-
ambiguously learns faster has simplified our identification of first-period
distortions, but has been immaterial to the derivation of the optimal con-
tract itself in Proposition 3.1. Without this assumption, it is still true
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c2(q1, θ)
c2(q1, θ)
q1
c2
0 q′1
q1 q1
c2(q1, θ
A)
c2(q1, θ
B)
q1
c2
0 q′1
q1(θ
B) q1(θ
A)
(a) Agent with Higher Learn-
ing Rate Ambiguous.
(b) Agent with Higher
Second-Period Costs Am-
biguous.
Figure 3: Examples of more General Second-Period Cost Functions.
that only the θ-type’s output is distorted, q2 is distorted downward given
q1, but the direction of the distortion in q1 given q2 will be ambiguous.
More specifically, consider the cost functions shown in Figure 3(a),
where the more efficient θ-agent learns faster for q1 < q
′
1 and slower for
q1 > q
′
1. Our characterization of partial distortions in q1 is then still
valid to the extent that they will be downward if q1 < q
′
1, and upward if
q1 > q
′
1. However, which regime is relevant is ambiguous and depends,
inter alia, on the value of output relative to its costs.
Intersecting Cost Curves: In contrast, the assumption that the θ-type
has lower second-period costs c2 for any q1 has indeed been vital to our
derivation of the optimal contract by determining which of the incentive
constraints must bind. This assumption precludes, however, the possi-
bility of one agent ‘overtaking’ the other due to learning effects.
Such a case is illustrated in Figure 3(b). Here, a straightforward ex-
tension to our previous analysis shows that (partial) distortions in q1(θ
B)
can only occur for q1(θ
B) < q′1 and will be upward, whereas distortions
in q1(θ
A) can only occur for q1(θ
A) > q′1 and will be downward. However,
which of these distortions occurs in the optimum is again ambiguous, and
both may in fact occur simultaneously.
The previous two examples generalize the main theme of our above
analysis in the following straightforward way: Distortions, if they oc-
cur, aim to reduce the (locally) less efficient agent’s cost-disadvantage.
Whether this requires an increase or a decrease in first-period output
depends on relative learning rates.
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Private Information on First-Period Costs: We have assumed type-
independent first-period costs c1 to focus on the role of asymmetric
information on the returns to learning by doing. If c1 also depends
on θ, we may generalize the θ-type’s comparative cost advantage to
Φ(q1, q2) ≡ [c1(θ)− c1(θ)]q1 + δ[c2(q1, θ)− c2(q1, θ)]q2. Under the assump-
tion that c1(θ)  c1(θ), the θ-type is still unambiguously more efficient
in both periods, and the derivation of the optimal contract goes through
unchanged.11 Particularly, the θ-type’s output schedule remains undis-
torted. There is now, however, an additional motive to distort q1 down-
ward in order to reduce the θ-type’s rent for first-period cost advantages,
which—depending on which agent learns faster—will either reinforce or
counteract the distortionary incentives identified above.
Finally, we note that if c2(q1, θ) = c2(q1, θ) for all q1, in addition, so
that private information concerns the cost-side exclusively , then we are
essentially in the setting considered by Lewis and Yildirim (2002a), and
learning-effects will always be underexploited for the θ-type.
Alternative Valuations of Output: We have assumed that the principal
values output at S(q1) + δS(q2). However, our key results concerning
(partial) distortionary incentives in Proposition 3.2 are robust to more
general valuation functions S˜(q).12 A particularly interesting extension
involves letting S˜ depend on q2 alone: In this case, our model represents
a pure investment problem with privately known returns, but where the
level of investment is contractible. Reinterpreting our above results, un-
derinvestment then ensues (in both a partial and an overall sense) if
investment returns (in terms of cost savings) become more sensitive to
private information with higher investment levels, whereas overinvest-
ment (at least in a partial sense) occurs in the reverse case.
11If c1(θ) > c1(θ), we again face a situation in which it is unclear which incentive
constraint binds at the optimum.
12Except for our analysis in Section 3.4, all above results in fact easily generalize
to cases in which the valuation function S˜(q) displays complementarities in q1 and
q2 in the sense that ∂2S˜/∂q1∂q2  0. To understand this, note that the analysis has
employed the particular form of valuation function only to the extent that it implies
additive separability of valuations in q1 and q2, which in turn implies that, due to cost-
side effects alone, the surplus function W is complementary in q1 and q2. Comparative
static results reliant on this complementarity (i.e., Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 3.3)
are thus robust to valuation functions which preserve this complementarity.
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4 Contracts under Spot Commitment
The analysis thus far has assumed that, before first-period production
takes place, the principal can commit to a contract spanning both peri-
ods of production. There are several reasons why it is interesting to relax
this assumption. First, it is quite conceivable that the principal indeed
cannot find a way to commit to not reneging after the first period, be
it due to restrictions imposed by the legal system or simply because the
regulatory authority’s commitment is limited to the current administra-
tion’s life-span.13 Second, limited commitment is generally understood
to be a deterrent to long-term investments (cf. Fudenberg et al., 1990).
It should thus be interesting to see how our overinvestment result in
particular stands up to limited commitment. Finally, limited commit-
ment has been the focus in the immediately related literature (Lewis and
Yildirim, 2002a, in particular), making the extension of our results to
limited commitment desirable for reasons of comparison.
We therefore assume in this section that parties are limited to spot
contracts: At the beginning of each period t ∈ {1, 2}, the principal can
offer a contract specifying quantities qt and transfers zt only for this
current period. The agent in turn can decline in each period, which
yields him a reservation utility of zero and terminates the game.
In this dynamic setting with stationary private information, a cen-
tral issue is the rate at which agents reveal this information over time.
Particularly, by the well-known ratchet effect (see Freixas et al., 1985;
Laffont and Tirole, 1987), constraints imposed by sequential rationality
generally preclude equilibria in which agents fully reveal their type in the
first-period, implying that there must be some degree of pooling in the
first period.
This partial revelation of information can be formalized by means
of an extension to the classical revelation principle due to Bester and
Strausz (2001). By this extension, we may restrict ourselves to mecha-
nisms where the principal makes the exchanged quantities dependent on
type reports θ˜t ∈ Θ made in each period to date. In the second and final
period, incentive constraints take the usual form, ensuring optimality of
the agent reporting his true type. In contrast, the partial revelation of
13In the above two-period contract, reneging will be mutually beneficial after first-
period production due to the usual interim inefficiencies (see, for instance Laffont and
Tirole, 1986). It should be borne in mind however that the principal has incentives
to find a commitment device since the ability to commit will always make him better
off.
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information in the first period takes the form of each type θ ∈ Θ re-
porting his true type with some probability p1(θ) > 0 which is strictly
positive—but not necessarily equal to one.
4.1 Characterizing the Optimal Contract
Due to the above invocation of Bester and Strausz’s revelation principle,
an equilibrium of our two-period model under spot contracts therefore
is described by quantities q1(θ˜1) and q2(θ˜1, θ˜2) and transfers z1(θ˜1) and
z2(θ˜1, θ˜2) in each period for any history of reports θ˜1, θ˜2 ∈ Θ, and prob-
abilities p1(θ) > 0 with which each type θ ∈ {θ, θ} reports his true type
in period one.
In a next step, in analogy to the full-commitment case, we may char-
acterize rents optimally paid to each type in each period, thereby elimi-
nating transfers from the principal’s optimization program. Consider first
the second period. At the start of the second period, previous gameplay
has resulted in a report θ˜1 made by the agent. This report in turn deter-
mines (i) the agent’s second-period marginal costs (via the first-period
output invoked by the report), and (ii) an updated belief for the principal
concerning the agent’s true type, determined through Bayesian updat-
ing by comparing types’ equilibrium reporting behavior p1(·) with the
actual report made. Given these type-dependent marginal costs and be-
liefs, the second-period subgame is identical to the standard one-period
framework, implying that second-period rents will be u2(θ˜1, θ) = 0 for
the inefficient agent, and u2(θ˜1, θ) = Φ[q1(θ˜1), q2(θ˜1, θ)] for the efficient
agent.
Concerning the first period, a specialty of our set-up is that first-
period rents are type-independent since first-period costs are, so that
we may simply denote the first-period rent by u1(θ˜1). Thus, incentive
constraints become
u1(θ) + Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]  u1(θ) + Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)],
u1(θ)  u1(θ),
whereas participation constraints read
u1(θ) + Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]  0,
u1(θ)  0.
Reproducing the argument from the full-commitment case, the θ-type’s
participation constraint can be neglected and the θ-type’s must bind.
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Hence, letting U(θ) = u(θ) + δu2(θ, θ) denote the equilibrium rent of
an agent of type θ, we have U(θ) = 0, and the remaining two incentive
constraints collapse to
Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]  U(θ)  Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]. (7)
where the first inequality denotes the θ-type’s incentive constraint, and
the second inequality denotes the θ-type’s incentive constraint.
But this is where parallels with the full-commitment case end and
sequential rationality and the ratchet effect kick in. To see how, suppose
that the θ-type’s incentive constraint (i.e., the second inequality in (7))
does not bind (as is the case under full commitment). This implies
that p1(θ) = 1, as the θ-agent will strictly prefer truthful reporting in
period 1. But this in turn implies that, having seen a first-period report
of θ, the principal is sure of the agent’s true type being θ. By sequential
rationality, the principal will optimally respond to this by setting the
θ-agent’s second-period rent Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)] to zero.
14 But then, since
Φ(·, ·)  0, both inequalities in (7)) must bind—a contradiction.
Hence, the inefficient type’s incentive compatibility condition must
bind, and the efficient type’s equilibrium rent is thereby pinned down
to U(θ) = Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]. With these results in place, the principal’s
optimization program may be formulated as follows:
Proposition 4.1. Under spot commitment, the principal optimally chooses
p1(·), p2(·) ∈ (0, 1], q1(·) and q2(·, ·) so as to maximize
E(θ˜1,θ)
{
W [q1(θ˜), q2(θ˜1, θ); θ]
}− ν · Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]
subject to
(a) the principal’s second-period beliefs over types being rational given
agents’ first-period reporting behavior p1(·),
(b) second-period quantities q2(·, ·) being sequentially optimal given first-
period production and the updated beliefs.
(c) Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]  Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)], with equality if p1(θ) < 1,15
Note that the clear characterization of the optimal spot contract in
Proposition 4.1 stands in stark contrast to the usual ambiguity concern-
ing which incentive constraint binds. Indeed, a key result in Laffont and
14He can always achieve this by setting q2(θ, θ) = 0.
15Ga¨rtner (2007) in fact shows that even if p1(θ) = 1, it will never be optimal for
the principal to leave this condition slack, implying that both incentive compatibility
conditions must bind in the optimum.
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Tirole’s (1987) two-type model of spot-contracting with constant (but
privately known) marginal costs is that, depending on the specific pa-
rameterization, four distinct types of equilibria will result depending on
which incentive constraint binds—an ambiguity which is reminiscent of
the standard one-period analysis when the Spence-Mirrlees sorting con-
dition is violated (cf. Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984). This ambiguity is
circumvented in our setting by focussing on the returns to learning by
doing: Assuming that first-period costs c1 are type-independent implies
that first-period rents u1 are type-independent as well, so that first-period
sorting (or ‘separation’) can be based only on second period rents u2.
Thus, in contrast to Laffont and Tirole (1987), there is no conflict be-
tween first- and second-period sorting conditions.16
4.2 Numerical Results
As noted above, rather than derive results concerning the direction of
distortions at the same level of generality as in Section 3 for the full-
commitment case, we confine ourselves in this section to presenting re-
sults for two specific examples which illustrate that, also under spot
commitment, both up- and downward distortions can occur.
4.2.1 Example 3: Inefficient Agent Learns Faster
We first consider an example for which the inefficient agent learns faster,
which we know under full commitment causes the inefficient agent’s first-
period output to be inefficiently high—at least given second-period out-
put. Specifically, we use the same setting used in Example 2 in Section 3
to illustrate the possibility of overall upward distortions under full com-
mitment:
Example 3. For the setting given in Example 2, equilibrium reporting
strategies under spot commitment are given by p1(θ) = 1 and p1(θ) =
0.74 for equilibrium output menus given by q1(θ) = 0.34, q1(θ) = 0.44,
q2(θ, θ) = 0.57, q2(θ, θ) = 0.60
17, q2(θ, θ) = 0.58, and q2(θ, θ) = 0.32.
As noted, there are multiple ways to gauge distortions in the spot
contract of Example 3 (comparisons are summarized in Table 1):
16As mentioned in Footnote 15, in this setting, it is in fact not only clear that the
θ-type’s incentive constraint must bind, but it can be shown that it will be optimal
for the principal to have both incentive constraints bind. This implies essentially that
there will be no first-period separation of types at all in our spot-commitment setup.
17Since p1(θ) = 1, the equilibrium value of q2(θ, θ) is not unique, as the principal
attaches zero probability to observing such a sequence of reports in equilibrium.
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Period 1 Period 2
q1(θ) q1(θ) q2(θ, θ) q2(θ, θ) q2(θ, θ) q2(θ, θ)
Probability 63% 37% 50% 0% 37% 13%
Spot Contract (SC) 0.341 0.444 0.565 0.604 0.576 0.319
(1) q∗1, q∗2 0.301 0.380 0.550 – 0.538 –
(2) q∗1, q∗2|pSC1 0.314 0.380 0.555 0.580 0.538 0.500
(3) q∗1|pSC1 , qSC2 0.301 0.396
(4) q∗2|pSC1 , qSC1 0.565 0.604 0.576 0.514
Note: Row ‘Probability’ shows probability of observing quantity in spot equilibrium; row
‘Spot Contract (SC)’ shows quantities in equilibrium spot contract; remaining rows are
explained in the text.
Table 1: Evaluating Output Distortions in Example 3.
(1) Comparison with Unconstrained First Best (q∗1, q
∗
2): First-best quan-
tities as described in Section 2 are shown in the third row of Table 1.
Distortions are easy to evaluate for the θ-type since he produces deter-
ministic quantities in the spot equilibrium (recall p(θ) = 1): His output is
higher under the spot contract than under the dynamic first-best. Com-
parisons are complicated for the θ-agent by his equilibrium quantities un-
der the spot contract being stochastic. However, his average first-period
quantity p1(θ)q1(θ) + (1 − p1(θ))q1(θ) = 0.42 exceeds q∗1(θ), whereas his
average second-period output of 0.51 falls short of q∗2(θ). Average overall
second-period output (i.e., averaged over both agents and reports) un-
der the spot contract (0.54) is higher, however, than average first-best
second-period output (0.52).
(2) Comparison with First Best Conditional on First-Period Reporting
(q∗1, q
∗
2|pSC1 ): Next, efficient levels of q1(·) and q2(·) given agents reporting
strategies under the spot contract are given in the fourth row of Table 1.
Compared to this benchmark, there is a clear upward distortion in both
agents’ period output and the θ-type’s second-period output. The direc-
tion of the distortion in the θ-type’s second-period output depends on his
first-period report, but the average distortion under the spot contract is
again upward.
(3) Comparison with Efficient First-Period Output Conditional on First-
Period Reporting and Second-Period Output (q∗1|pSC1 , qSC2 ): Row five of
Table 1 shows that given (i) agents’ reporting strategies and (ii) second-
period output, both type’s first-period output is inefficiently high under
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spot contracting.
(4) Comparison with Efficient Second-Period Output Conditional on First-
Period Reporting and First-Period Output (q∗2|pSC1 , qSC1 ): The last line of
Table 1 shows that there is no distortion in the θ-agent’s second-period
output given his first-period output. Moreover, since p1(θ) = 1 and there-
fore ν2(θ) = 0, the θ-agent’s second-period is also efficient under truthful
reporting by this measure, whereas it is inefficiently low for a θ-report.
4.2.2 Example 4: Efficient Agent Learns Faster
To round off this section of numerical examples, Example 4 below presents
a setting in which the more efficient agent also learns faster. As one may
expect, results in this example are less surprising in that the spot equi-
librium entails unambiguous downward distortion in quantities traded:
Example 4. Assume the value of output to the principal is given by
S(qt) = 100qt − 80q2t , cost structures are c1 = 75, c2(q1, θ) = 60 − 70q1,
and c2(q1, θ) = 65−60q1, ν = 0.5, and δ = 0.7. The spot equilibrium then
involves no revelation of information in the first period with q1 = 0.237,
and second-period outputs (contingent only on second-period reports) of
q2(θ) = 0.354 and q2(θ) = 0.262.
Comparisons of output distortions are shown in Table 2.18 Relative
to all benchmarks, outputs are distorted downward in the equilibrium
spot contract. Moreover, in this setting, the ‘benevolent first-period
principal’ will implement the report-independent first-period quantity
of q1 = 0.251, resulting in second-period quantities of q2(θ) = 0.360 and
q2(θ) = 0.267. Hence, also relative to this benchmark, quantities are
unambiguously distorted downward.
5 Conclusion
Our model has analyzed how the introduction of privately known learn-
ing capabilities into the standard dynamic model of adverse selection
influences incentive design. Contrary to previous work by Lewis and
18To present the results in the same format as Table 1, Table 2 equivalently presents
the equilibrium in Example 4 as a mechanism with first-period message but where
contracts are independent of this message and reporting strategies are completely
uninformative (i.e., p1(θ) = 1− p1(θ)).
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Period 1 Period 2
q1(θ) q1(θ) q2(θ, θ) q2(θ, θ) q2(θ, θ) q2(θ, θ)
Probability 50% 50% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Spot Contract (SC) 0.237 0.237 0.354 0.354 0.262 0.262
(1) q∗1, q
∗
2 0.267 0.237 0.368 – 0.308 –
(2) q∗1, q
∗
2|pSC1 0.253 0.253 0.361 0.361 0.313 0.313
(3) q∗1|pSC1 , qSC2 0.245 0.245
(4) q∗2|pSC1 , qSC1 0.354 0.354 0.308 0.308
Note: See the explanation in Table 1 and in the text.
Table 2: Evaluating Output Distortions in Example 4.
Yildirim (2002a), we have considered a setting in which agents are pri-
vately informed about the rate at which they learn rather than just the
cost side.
The focus of our investigation has been on whether this information
being private leads to an under- or an overexploitation of learning effects
relative to the efficient level. Under full commitment, we have shown that
this crucially depends on whether learning effects let inherently more ef-
ficient agents expand their lead, or whether they enable inherently less
efficient agents to catch up. In the first case, we obtain results similar to
Lewis and Yildirim’s in that learning effects will be under-exploited—the
only difference being that in our case, this distortion can be so strong as
to eliminate the exploitation of learning effects altogether. In the second
case, we obtain entirely new results: If learning effects let inherently less
efficient agents catch up, the principal has an incentive to overexploit
learning effects. Moreover, we have shown that this effect is not driven
by the full-commitment assumption: An overexploitation of learning ef-
fects may result also under spot commitment, despite the general notion
that limited commitment tends to deter rather than encourage long-term
investments.
More generally, our analysis has shown that in order to predict an
under- or overexploitation of learning effects in dynamic adverse selec-
tion settings, it is important to identify whether these learning effects
serve to magnify or to diminish existing differences in efficiency between
types. Concerning vertical procurement relationships, for instance, we
may seek to categorize supplying industries along these lines according
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to their technology. For instance, consider rather simple low-tech in-
puts produced in more traditional ‘bread-and-butter’ industries where
there is little scope for large technological improvements. Even if there
is originally some scope for improvements through learning by doing, we
would eventually expect all agents to ‘catch on to the trick’ (some types
sooner, some later), after which there is little scope for further improve-
ment. Thus, we would expect learning effects to quickly subside and to
equalize agents’ productivity. In such industries, our model would pre-
dict learning effects to be over- rather than under-exploited. In contrast,
consider suppliers of more high-tech products such as the computer chip
industry. Here, we would expect significant scope for long-run improve-
ments in production technologies. Further, we would expect inherently
more innovative and creative suppliers to ever increase their lead over
less efficient suppliers through accumulated learning effects. For such
suppliers, our model predicts learning effects to be under- rather than
overexploited. Similar technological arguments may be applied to the
regulation of monopolistic suppliers.
One may also imagine applications of our model outside of the realm
of pure procurement and regulation settings. Take, for instance, labor
contracts of the type considered in Miyazaki’s (1977) ‘internal labor mar-
ket rat race’, where employees’ productivity on the job is privately known,
and labor contracts specify how hard an agent is expected to work on the
job. Assume, in addition, that how hard an agent works today influences
his future productivity on the job. If we expect hard work to make a less
efficient worker catch up with the more efficient worker’s productivity,
we should expect the employer to ask agents to work inefficiently hard on
the job—essentially, aggravating the ‘rat race’. If, on the other hand, we
expect harder work today to magnify productivity differences between
workers (as might be the case on more creative jobs), we should expect
the employer to relax workers’ workload below the efficient level.
Other potential fields of application may include credit market prob-
lems in the style of Freixas and Laffont (1990), where the borrower is
privately informed about the returns to his project. If the project’s fu-
ture returns systematically depend on the size of the loan today, then our
analysis would predict inefficiently high first-period loans if raising loans
has a larger impact on productivity in inherently less productive projects,
and vice versa if productivity in inherently more productive projects is
more strongly affected. Finally, the insights may be applied to models
of discrimination in quantity or quality by a monopolistic supplier of a
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consumption good (see Maskin and Riley, 1984; Mussa and Rosen, 1978)
if we assume that consumers get used to or even addicted to the good,
so that consuming more (or a higher quality) of the good today increases
consumers’ willingness to pay tomorrow.19 The learning-speed criterion
of our model then pertains to whether customers with a higher willing-
ness to pay for the good also get used to the good faster, or whether it
is the customers who value the good less who get used to it at a faster
rate. Our analysis predicts an underexploitation of the ‘addiction factor’
in the former case, and an overexploitation in the latter.
19The idea of such ‘rational addiction’ has been introduced by Becker and Murphy
(1988), albeit in the context of a competitive market. Boone and Shapiro (2006)
have more recently investigated a setting quite similar to the application we have
in mind here, the main difference being that the discriminating monopolist sells on
‘anonymous’ spot markets, that is, any information revealed to him in the first-period
is useless in the second-period). However, in many settings, even if the seller has a
sizeable number of clients, he can nonetheless design a ‘personalized’ sequence of
contracts, as is done for instance by video rental chains by means of membership
cards.
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Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Results in Section 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Using elementary robust comparative statics and super-
modular analysis (cf. Topkis, 1998), the results require identifying suitable
complementarity relations among q1, q2 and θ in the objective function W . Ob-
serve first that ∂
2
∂q1∂q2
W = −δ ∂∂q1 c2 > 0, so that W has increasing differences
in q, implying that qˆ∗1 and qˆ∗2 are both increasing in the quantity produced in
the other period. Next, ∂∂q2W = −δc2, which is increasing in θ since we have
assumed c2 to decrease in θ. Hence, W has increasing differences in (q2, θ),
implying that qˆ∗1 is increasing in θ. Finally,
∂
∂q1
W = −δq2 ∂∂q1 c2. Thus, W has
increasing differences in (q1, θ) if more efficient agents learn faster (|∂c2/∂q1|
increasing in θ), and decreasing differences if less efficient agents learn faster,
yielding the comparative static result for qˆ∗1 in θ. Finally, if more efficient
agents learn faster, W will thereby have increasing differences in all pairs of
arguments, implying that q∗ is increasing in θ.
A.2 Proofs of Results in Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Using the Φ-function defined in (3), the incentive
constraints may be written compactly as
U  U + Φ(q) (A.1)
U  U − Φ(q). (A.2)
Using the surplus functions W and W and agents’ rents U and U , the princi-
pal’s payoff from any contract may be written as
ν[W (q)− U ] + (1− ν)[W (q)− U ]. (A.3)
The principal maximizes this payoff by choice of {q, U} and {q, U}, subject
to incentive constraints (A.1) and (A.2), and subject to the participation con-
straints, which we restate here for easy reference:
U  0 (A.4)
U  0. (A.5)
Observe first that only allocations satifsfying the implementability condition
Φ(q)  Φ(q) (A.6)
can be realized. This condition follows from combining (A.1) and (A.2).
Next, we argue that for any menu of allocations {q,q} satisfying (A.6), the
principal will optimally set U = 0 and U = Φ(q). To see this, note first that
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constraint (A.4) may be neglected: Since Φ  0, it is implied by (A.1) and
(A.5). Given this insight, the principal must optimally set U = 0: Otherwise,
he could decrease U and U by the same small amount without violating any of
the remaining constraints, and thereby strictly increase his payoff (A.3). But
then the remaining constraints, (A.1) and (A.2), simplify to Φ(q)  U  Φ(q),
so that the principal must optimally set U = Φ(q): If not, we could decrease U
by a small amount without violating any of the remaining constraints. Finally,
this implies that the only remaining constraint, (A.2), simply becomes (A.6).
Hence, the principal’s optimization problem may be restated as choosing
q and q so as to maximize
ν[W (q)− Φ(q)] + (1− ν)W (q) (A.7)
subject to (A.6). Due to the additively separable structure and since ν ∈ (0, 1),
this is equivalent to condition (4). To complete the proof, it therefore remains
to be shown that any {q,q} satisfying (4) also satisfy (A.6). The former
implies in particular that
W (q) W (q) and W (q)− ν
1− νΦ(q) W (q)−
ν
1− νΦ(q). (A.8)
Since W (q) − W (q) = Φ(q) for any q by the definition of W and W , the
inequalities in (A.8) may be added to yield Φ(q)/(1 − ν)  Φ(q)/(1 − ν),
which implies (A.6).
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We again employ supermodular analysis to derive
the results. To this end, define the real-valued function g(q; τ) such that
g(q; τ) =
{
W (q), for τ = 0,
W (q)− ν1−νΦ(q), for τ = 1.
(A.9)
(a) For any q,
∂
∂q2
g(q; 1)− ∂∂q2 g(q; 0) = − ν1−ν ∂∂q2Φ(q), (A.10)
which is strictly negative (see the definition of Φ). Thus, for any q1, g has
strictly decreasing differences in q2 and τ , implying that argmaxq2 g(q1, q2; τ)
is decreasing in τ for any q1. By definition of g, this set corresponds to the
conditional second-period first-best for τ = 0 and to the conditional second-
period second-best, which proves the claim.
(b) For any q,
∂
∂q1
g(q; 1)− ∂∂q1 g(q; 0) = − ν1−ν ∂∂q1Φ(q), (A.11)
the sign of which depends on whether the more efficient θ-agent also learns
faster ( ∂∂q1Φ(q)  0) or whether the θ-agent learns faster (
∂
∂q1
Φ(q)  0), with
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each of these inequalities being strict for q2 > 0. Thus, whenever the more
efficient agent learns faster, g has decreasing differences in q1 and τ for any q2
(and strictly so for any q2 > 0), which proves claim (bi). On the other hand,
whenever the less efficient agent learns faster, g has increasing differences in
q1 and τ for any q2, thereby proving part (bii).
Proof of Proposition 3.3. We again employ the auxiliary function g(q; τ) de-
fined in (A.9) in the proof of Proposition 3.2, so that q∗ ∈ argmaxq g(q; 0)
and qSB ∈ argmaxq g(q; 1). As established there, for the case at hand, g has
strictly decreasing differences in q2 and τ for any q1, and strictly decreasing dif-
ferences in q1 and τ for any q2 > 0. Hence, g has strictly decreasing differences
in (q, τ). Moreover, g is supermodular in q for τ = 0 since W is supermodular
in q (see the proof of Proposition 2.1). Hence, the set of maximizers of g is
decreasing in τ , which proves the claim.20
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Observe first that qˆ1SB(0) = q◦1 since the principal’s
optimal choice of q1 conditional on q2 = 0 simply maximizes first-period sur-
plus.21 Moreover, qˆ1SB(qSB2 ) = q
SB
1 by definition of the full and conditional
optima. Since qSB2  0, learning effects will thus be exploited if qˆ1SB(q2) is
increasing in q2, and unexploited if it is decreasing. This in turn depends on
whether the principal’s objective W − νΦ has increasing or decreasing differ-
ences in (q1, q2). Using the definitions of W and Φ, we have
∂2
∂q1∂q2
{
W (q)− ν1−νΦ(q)
}
= δ1−ν
[∣∣ ∂
∂q1
c2(q1)
∣∣− ν · ∣∣ ∂∂q1 c2(q1)∣∣
]
,
so that the former will be the case whenever condition (6) holds (and the latter
whenever (6) is reversed), which completes the proof.
20Note that supermodularity of g in q for τ = 1 is not required for the proof (and
not generally satisfied). The interested reader is invited to verify that, given a binary
parameter space, Theorem 2.8.1 in Topkis (1998) in fact requires supermodularity
of the objective for only one of the two parameter values: Together with increasing
differences, this is easily seen to imply Topkis’ condition (2.8.1), which produces the
result by Lemma 2.8.1.
21The same is true of the conditional first-best output, i.e. qˆ1∗(0) = q◦1 , which is
why the qˆ1SB- and qˆ1∗-curves meet at q2 = 0 in Figure 2.
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